http://www.usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Strategic%20Perspective&pubno=40&ano=2678
Leveraging International Pressures to Neutralise Pakistan Based Terror NetworkColonel Akshaya Handa*
India has long been subjected to terror sponsored from Pakistan. It however, has not been the only country which has suffered from the malaise. The US Department of State alone at various times has identified Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria amongst others as state sponsors of terrorism[1]. The list in more recent times is reported to include Pakistan, Venezuela, Russia, Qatar, Eretria, Lebanon, Syria and Cuba amongst others. Daniel Byman, a leading scholar on terrorism defines state sponsorship as “a government's intentional assistance to a terrorist group to help it use violence, bolster its political activities, or sustain organisation.” His research identifies six areas in which states provide support to terrorists — training and operations; money, arms, and logistics; diplomatic backing; organisational assistance; ideological direction; and sanctuary[2].
Such state sponsored terror, has traditionally been combated by a combination of engagement, economic pressure, international pressure and / or force[3]. However, use of force, though effective in extreme cases may not be an option when dealing with a nuclear armed Pakistan. Hence, a combination of engagement, international and economic pressure may well be the only options available. Amongst these Pakistan has been most susceptible to international pressure especially when it includes the US and China. Under their pressure at various times, Pakistan has taken action against militants in Afghanistan, selected militants groups in Jan 2002[4], Kashmir Groups in 2006-07[5], Lal Masjid[6],[7], etc. Pakistan however, has managed to contain and limit their actions by :–
(a) Showing itself to be indispensable to the international efforts to stabilise Afghanistan based upon :–
(i) What it tries to project as its ability to manage the militants in Afghanistan.
(ii) Its control over the logistics routes.
(b) Selectively targeting some militants and letting others get away.
Once more a situation seems to be emerging wherein it may be possible to build effective international pressure on Pakistan to dismantle its terror infrastructure when: -
(a) Pakistan’s ability and/or willingness to manage militants is being questioned.
(b) Options are feasible to reduce/eliminate Pakistan’s stranglehold over the logistics to Afghanistan. An option which has the potential to act as the required economic pressure too.
(c) Pakistan itself has started to realise the futility of selective targeting of militants as visible in the offensive launched against TTP on 23 May 14[8]. The offensive has been launched against the TTP in an area which is not far from the camps of the Haqqani group that are friendly to the Pak army and are also known to shelter, train and have common cadres with some Kashmir groups[9].
Grassroots Amalgamation of Terror Groups
With the exception of the Ahl-e-Hadith based LeT, all the other Punjabi groups trace their roots to the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. While the former is Salafist in orientation the latter were from the Deobandi Sect which is shared by the, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e- Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). Formed in 1989 and blending Deobandi and Wahhabi leanings, TNSM mobilized men for Taliban[10]. Thus with almost a common cadre the Punjabi groups increased their ties to one another as well as to the Afghan groups[11] during the 1990s[12].
Post the raid on Lal Masjid and the eruption of insurgency in 2007-08, Pakistan security establishment started making more sustained counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts against anti-state militants inside and outside FATA. The focus however of these efforts remained on militants operating against the state while militants which the state thought it could control were protected[13]. Inevitably some anti-state militants inevitably seeped through in an effort to give safe passage to pro-state militants. The cumulative result has been to bog down a sizeable number of troops only to displace anti-state militants who later return or begin launching attacks elsewhere.
The enormity of this vicious cycle seems to have dawned on the Pak security forces finally as for the first time an offensive has been launched in an area where the pro and anti-state militants are located in close vicinity[14]. While it is too early to say that Pakistan is abandoning its militant clones however, the realization that Pak can no longer differentiate between pro and anti-state militants can be a start point of the dismantling of the Pak terror infrastructure provided sufficient international pressure is brought to bear. The terrorism situation in China seems to suggest that in the months to come, China may well become a part of this international pressure.
Terrorism in China
China in general and Xinjiang in particular have witnessed terror strikes over the years. Post each strike while the local government blamed the Pakistan based terror infrastructure; the central government followed a much softer approach[15]. However, the recent incidents have indicated emergence of three new trends which may change the latter.
One, for the first time areas outside China's peripheral regions (Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia,) have been targeted. These regions historically have been held by China only when it was strong and its approach to various issues in these is distinctly different from the rest of China - also called the Chinese heartland or Han China. This newly displayed ability of the terrorists to strike in the Chinese heartland would certainly raise the decibels for action against Pak based infrastructure. Coming at a time when China is facing what some call socio-economic stress[16]; would only lead to more vocal calls for action.
Two, while explosives had been used in terror strikes in China earlier, post 9/11 the Chinese security establishment had managed to keep these outside the options available for terrorists. The latter had to rely on more unconventional tools including knives, swords and even high speed vehicles to mow down the victims. However, the successful use of explosives in Urumqi on 22 May 14 shows that the terrorists have managed to bypass the Chinese security apparatus. While these were used well outside the Chinese heartland and more in a hand-grenade mode - in context of other less lethal strikes in the Chinese heartland - it would be vain to assume Han China to be secure from explosives any longer. Moreover once explosives are available[17] the graduation to much lethal (and safer for the terrorists) IEDs is but a matter of time. This would certainly place the security establishment under increased strain.
Three, for the first time, indications suggest that apart from the so called separatist Muslims of Xinjiang - Muslims residing in other parts of China too have been affected by radicalisation and taken to terrorism. It is suspected that the 06 May 14 attack in Guangzhou, was carried out by the radicals of the Han Muslim Hui population[18]. Earlier too it was suspected that the Hui had been involved in sheltering the Xinjiang based terror suspects[19]. If true, it would imply that the reach of the radicals has managed to create a rift in the Han Chinese society. A rift which is not based on social or economic disparities but rather on religion, a development which can further increase problems for the Chinese security forces.
Put together, the above would increase societal pressure on the Chinese regime to take action against the Pakistan based terror infrastructure. This may well be the opportune moment to rope in other powers, who too seek a dismantling of the Pak terror network. For this the importance of Pakistan in stabilising Afghanistan (including controlling its logistics route) needs to be reduced. In the regional context, these developments are occurring when a withdrawal / drawback of International Security Assistance Force from Afghanistan is imminent and a possible rapprochement between Iran and the US is on the horizon.
Pak – US Equation
The strategic value of Pakistan for the US essentially stems from Pakistan's perceived ability to manage the Islamic terror networks operating in Afghanistan and the logistics link controlled by it. Even while the US is seeking to withdraw its forces it wants to ensure against Afghanistan reverting to being a refuge for transnational jihad. At the end of the day, this is the real US national interest in Afghanistan[20]. To ensure the same, the US is seeking a bilateral security agreement which is a proposal to secure an external military presence beyond the predicted coalition withdrawal date of 2014. The US has tied the inflow of $4 billion in foreign aid annually with the signing of the same[21]. This does indicate a long term US commitment to Afghanistan and its security forces – which are expected to play a pivotal role in stabilising Afghanistan post the withdrawal. Hence, maintenance of the logistics link is crucial for the US role in the region. The issue becomes all the more critical as post Ukraine (and the western sanctions on Russia), the northern supply network passing through Russia is being questioned by the latter[22]. If the threat to deny the same becomes a reality, Pakistan’s leverage only increases.
Even though the US has for long questioned Pak sincerity in tackling militants, it frequently had to abide by Pak sensibilities under the threat of disruption of supplies. Hence, even while questioning Pakistan’s sincerity, the logistics requirement for not only its own forces but also the fledgling Afghan National Security Forces, precludes the US from seriously seeking a break or challenging the Pakistan terror network[23]. This dependence would only increase in the short term as the US seeks a safe withdrawal and to stabilise the post withdrawal Afghanistan.
Geographically Iran is ideally located to provide an alternate route and thus reduce / eliminate this dependence. Historically, not only it has been on the other side of the Shia - Sunni divide, but even in Afghanistan has been supporting forces opposing the Pakistan sponsored groups[24]. In more recent times the frequent massacre of Shias, actions of Pakistan based Jundullah group and the abduction of Iranian border guards by Pak based terrorist group Jaish al-Adl has led to major disagreements between the two. Complicating matters is the Iranian suspicion that Jaish al-Adl is Riyadh's agents as rival Saudi Arabia tries to undermine Iranian influence and stability[25]. Hence Iran has the incentive to provide a route to bypass Pakistan. Considering the stakes for Iran in Afghanistan, Iran may well welcome it.
The infrastructure being built by India in Iran is ideally located to play the role. Chabahar port[26] and the road linking it to Zabol and thereafter through Zaranj and Delaram with Herat and Kabul[27] has reportedly been under construction for a while. The port was partially built by India in 1990s[28] and is connected to multimodal transportation system. It reportedly already has two jetties that connect it to international waterways and is handling 6 million tons of goods a year and has a reported capacity to handle up to 12.5 million tons a year[29]. It is connected to national road networks and the government is pursuing a railway project[30] which will connect Chabahar port to Central Asia, Afghanistan and Central Iran. With a suitable impetus to speed up its construction and scaling it up with possibly a gas / oil pipeline, it can cater for the logistics requirements of supporting the Afghan regime. In the long term it can also provide the link to the Central Asian Republics.
It is anticipated that once the US dependence on the logistics routes through Pakistan is reduced, not only would Pakistan be deprived of the exorbitant transit fees being charged by it but the US and the Afghan National Security Forces would also get a comparatively free hand for striking in the Pakistan tribal areas where this network thrives. If this was to occur when the Chinese too build up pressure for action against the terror infrastructure, the Pakistan Army may well be goaded to act against its cronies.
Conclusion
Pakistan had for long believed that it could control the activities of the militants created by it. Even when the insurgency broke out post the Lal Masjid incident, it continued to differentiate between the pro and anti-state militants. For the first time however, it has launched an offensive in an area occupied by militants of both shades. While it would be too early to believe the futility of their policy – differentiating between various militants – has finally been acknowledged; it is an opportune time to increase the international pressure for dismantling the terror network. Earlier too Pakistan has at least partly succumbed under such international pressure.
It is anticipated that in the months to come, the Chinese Government is likely to come under domestic pressure to either act or at least seek action against the terror infrastructure in Pakistan. If prior to that the dependence (of the International Security Assistance Force and Afghan Security Forces) on the logistics routes through Pakistan is reduced and suitable alternatives made available – adequate pressure can be built on Pakistan to take appropriate action against the terror infrastructure. Chabahar port and the infrastructure linking it to Afghanistan and The Central Asian Republics would be ideal for the same and hence requires suitable impetus for early completion.
Endnotes
1.http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/5/terrorism%20byman/05_terrorism_byman.pdf
2. Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism ,London: Cambridge University Press, 2005
3. http://www.ukessays.com/dissertations/international-studies/cross-border-terrorism.php
4. “Pakistani Television Airs Musharraf’s Taped Address,” CNN,January 12, 2002; “Pakistani President Bans Islamic Militant Groups,” CNN,January 12, 2002. On the influence of U.S. pressure and Pakistan’s desire to avoid war with India on the decision to institute the bans, see Tankel, Storming the World Stage, 115; Nayak and Krepon, “US Crisis Management.”
5. Tankel, Storming the World Stage, p. 128; on Back Channel negotiations, see Steve Coll, “The Back Channel: India and Pakistan’s Secret Kashmir Talks,” New Yorker, March 2, 2009
6. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW89-Domestic%20Barriers%20to%20Dismantling%20the
% 20Militant%20Infrastructure%20in%20Pakistan.pdf
7. Pardesi, “The Battle for the Soul,” p. 100; White, “Vigilante Islamism in Pakistan.”
8. http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1528
9. Op. Cit. 6.
10. Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), p. 465
11. Most notably Taliban, Haqqani network, and TNSM.
12. Op. Cit. 6.
13. Inevitably many operations ended with peace agreements with the insurgents. Emboldened, the militants operating there, began to occupy areas of SWAT before expanding to other districts of FATA [and more recently Baluchistan (see http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives /sair12/12_47.htm #assessment1)] too. Subsequently, the military did launch operations (like Operation Rah-e-Rast in May 2009 and Rah-e-Nijat the following month) in which they successfully routed many militants,
14. http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1528
15. http://www.southasaianalysis.org/node/1482 also see http://c3sindia.org/afghanistan/3090
16. http://www.irgamag.com/component/k2/item/9135
17. On 26 May 14, police reportedly seized 1.8 tonnes of bomb material in Xinjiang. See http://www.newsdeck120.com/articles/china-police-seize-1-dot-8-tonnes-of-bomb-material-in-xinjiang
18. The Hui are of mixed ethnic origin, blending Han Chinese with ancestry from western China, Central Asia and the Middle East. There are Hui communities in most major cities, though they are mainly concentrated in southern Yunnan and the provinces stretching from the central-western portion of China to the coast, including Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Henan, Hebei and Shandong provinces. Although considered an ethnic minority in China, the Hui generally speak Mandarin Chinese. They maintain close relations with the majority Han and are distinguished more by their religious practices than by their ethnic traditions.
19. http://www.irgamag.com/component/k2/item/8844
20. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100901_militancy_us_drawdown_afghanistan
21. http://irgamag.com/component/k2/item/6014
22. http://www.irgamag.com/component/k2/item/8328
23. An example of this is when the US has slowed down drone operations under Pakistani pressure, as the Obama administration fears that Pakistani covert support to the Afghan Taliban and other Pak-backed terrorist formations operating in Afghanistan could significantly jeopardize the safety of its troops in the final phases of their ‘withdrawal’. See http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair12/12_8.htm#assessment1
24. http://www.irgamag.com/component/k2/item/6105
25. http://www.irgamag.com/component/k2/item/8246
26. It has been reported that the port has become partly operational from 03 Mar 14, see http://www.manilatimes.net/india-advances-trade-plans-with-iran/81105/
27. Through what is called route 606. Also called Afghanistan’s garland highway or AO 1.
28. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_of_Chabahar
29. http://www.livemint.com/Politics/1b1u7UDQbP7MecdCtaq4uK/UPA-racing-against-time-to-push-through-Chabahar-port-pact.html
30. Which was named "Iran's eastern corridor"
*Colonel Akshaya Handa was commissioned into 7 PARA and commanded 19 RR (SIKH LI). He is a member of USI.
(Article uploaded on June 18, 2014).
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