US Approach to ISIS and Implications for Afghanistan and India: An Article on USI Website

US Approach to ISIS and Implications for Afghanistan and IndiaColonel Akshaya Handa^@
 

US withdrew from Iraq in end 2011, since then the Iraqi insurgency has grown in strength. Militants of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) [or Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) as some call it] have taken over large swathes of territory, reportedly imposed their version of puritanical Islam and are threatening Baghdad. While some commentators have chosen to lay the blame on other nations, others point out how it was expected and but a matter of time. However, one fact which all agree on is that the Iraqi Security Forces (despite their much vaunted US training) have failed to protect the state allowing sectarian forces to emerge in the vacuum. As a result, Sunni ISIS is being battled by resurgent Shiite militia (like the Mahdi Army) and Kurd’s Peshmerga. In the emerging situation, so far the US has not committed to place boots on ground to stabilize the situation.

         In the months to come, US is likely to withdraw from Afghanistan as well. The question is, can the withdrawal lead to a similar resurgence of the militants, if it does how would it destabilize the region and what course the US is likely to follow to re-establish stability.

Importance of Afghanistan in the Fight Against Fundamental Islam

Khurasan (or as some call it Khorasan) plays an important role in the Islamic prophecies of end times. The Islamic prophecies believe that Imam Mehdi with an army of black flags would appear in the region and help Imam Mehdi to establish his Caliphate in the Holy Kabah. The prophecy is attributed to the Prophet himself who has supposed to have cited Khurasan to his east. Islamists believe that as the prophet lived most of his life in Mecca and last 10 years in Medina – both of which are in present day Saudi Arabia, hence the much vaunted Khurasan would in Pakistan and / or Afghanistan, which are the largest Islamic countries East of Saudi Arabia[i].

         Historically, the area of Khurasan lies in the northeast of Persia comprising principally the cities of Balkh, Herat and Taloqan (now in Afghanistan), Mashhad, Nishapur and Sabzevar (now in northeastern Iran), Merv, Nisa and Abiward (now in southern Turkmenistan), and Samarqand and Bukhara (now in Uzbekistan)[ii]. The area was principally populated by Zorashtarians and Buddhists till the Muslims conquest of Persia in 651 AD.  It is believed that in 628 AD Muhammad sent a letter through one of his officers, Abdullah Huzafah Sahmi Qarashi, to Khosrau II the then Persian ruler, inviting him to convert to Islam. However, the latter tore the letter in anger. This led to the invasion of Persia (by Mohammad’s successor Abu Bakr who took the title Caliph and his successor Umar) and its final subjugation in 651 AD[iii].

         Hence, as per the Islamic prophecies, the region comprising of North East Iran, Afghanistan, Southern Turkmenistan and parts of Uzbekistan is where the Mehdi Army is likely to emerge and be instrumental in re-establishing the holy caliphate. It can therefore safely be inferred that till an ideology exists which seeks to re-establish the Islamic caliphate – its followers would do their utmost to establish their reign in Khurasan or Afghanistan. While capabilities would be a factor however, all attempts would be made to make up capabilities that they are lacking in. However, recent history against USSR and US has shown that lack of capabilities has never deterred the militants albeit spurred them to resort to terrorism. Moreover, control of Afghanistan alone is not going to satisfy the militants as they would seek to enlarge their control over the complete Khurasan.

        Further, the Islamists believe that after the victory in Khurasan the Ummah (Arabic for one country) would give rise to two forces, one of which would conquer India in what they term as Ghazwa-e-Hind[iv]. This is supposedly predicted in the Hadiths given in the Six Books of Hadees known as the ‘sihah e sitta’[v]. The use of the word Ghazwa is important as it connotes those battles in which Prophet Mohammed himself participates[vi].

       Hence, re-emergence of Islamists rule over Afghanistan is likely to destabilize and pose an increased threat of terrorism to large parts of South and Central Asia including India. Hence, it would be in India’s interest to support all such forces which oppose emergence of Taliban rule in Afghanistan.

US Foreign Policy in South and Central Asia 

The US foreign policy in the region seems to working with the following aims: -

(a)    Homeland Security.      The US attacked Afghanistan after Al Qaeda based their successfully launched attacks on the US homeland. Saddam’s suspected links with Al Qaeda again was used as an excuse to attack Iraq. These wars were intended to prevent al Qaeda from ever attacking the United States again in the fashion of 9/11[vii]. However, their interest in both the regions waned once US was convinced that their ability to strike US homeland had been suitably reduced. Notably the US did not have the same response against other nations or Islamic groups from which it did not deem a threat to its homeland. The notables in this include Libya, Al Qaeda in Islamic Margebh, Al Qaeda in Arabic Peninsula, Al Shabab or Boko Haraam.

(b)    Control Spread of Nuclear Weapons or their Falling into the Hands of Non State Actors.    The spread of militancy in a nuclear armed region poses issues for the nuclear non proliferators. Apart from the threat of nuclear weapons falling in the hands of the militants there are three additional dangerous scenarios[viii]. The first is terrorists and their sympathizers wittingly or unwittingly causing radioactive leakages by raiding nuclear establishments and damaging the production process. Second is the danger of the terrorists getting hold of easy-to-use nuclear material such as dirty bombs from ill-guarded establishments. Thirdly is the danger of leakage of technology to terrorists by sympathetic scientists.

(c)    Maintain Balance of Power.    The US has mostly attempted to maintain a balance of power in the region thereby playing powers against each other. The India-Pak, Iran-Iraq, Japan-China, Israel-Arab equations are all examples of the same. Balance of power is built on the assumption that regional challengers confront regional opponents who will counterbalance them. Balance-of-power theory assumes the leading power (read US) intervenes only when an imbalance occurs[ix]. However, before balances of power are created, great powers must ensure that a balance is possible. Post 2008 US seems to be moving away from active balancing in favor of allowing regional balances of power to maintain themselves[x]. While being non-interventionist it allows the US the freedom of shifting the onus of intervention to regional players. In fact some believe that a new foreign doctrine is emerging in the United States -- a doctrine in which the United States does not take primary responsibility for events, but which allows regional crises to play out until a new regional balance is reached[xi]. Under the emerging doctrine, the absence of an overwhelming American interest means that the fate of a country like Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan is in the hands of its people or neighboring countries.

(d)    Stop Domination of Eurasian Landmass by Single Power.     The US realizes that Eurasia dominated by a single power would allow the latter to match its resources. Hence, by opposing Germany before and during the great wars, USSR in the cold war and keeping a wary eye on China allows it to ensure that the Eurasian landmass has multiple and competing powers[xii]. If however, events lead to a possibility of a change (as it seemed during the Ukraine crisis) US focus would shift overwhelmingly towards this problem.

(e)    Dominate World’s Oceans.     Domination of world’s oceans has been a consistent US policy aim since the end of WWII. However, it does not really affect its policies towards the region.

(f)     Ensure Access to Availability of Middle East Oil and Gas.   The western economic model is highly dependent on availability of cheap energy. Hence, since WWII sustaining its availability and access from its largest reservoir - Middle East - was critical. This however led to an unwanted dependence on local leaders, a large number of whom were despotic and dictatorial. However, in the last few years, availability of alternate sources, shale gas, alternate fuels and more efficient energy utilization has led to a much reduced focus on this goal. It is estimated by some that in a couple of years US may well become a net exporter of energy. Hence, its stakes in a stable middle east and allied regions would be highly reduced.

           An analysis of their policy goals shows that the: -

(a)   US would not put boots on ground till

(i)    US homeland or direct interests are threatened.

(ii)   Threat of nuclear proliferation is a distinct possibility.

(iii)  One single power becomes strong enough to dominate the Eurasian landmass or challenge US domination of the oceans – in which event the US is likely to give the highest priority to the problem

(b)    Hence, the US approach to ISIS / ISIL in Iraq is likely to be along the following lines: -

(i)   Push local governments to become inclusive and non-sectarian in the hope that it leads to a western style democracy with focus on economic prosperity and rule of law.

(ii)  Impose international pressure and economic sanctions on the militants and their backers.

(iii)  Conduct air strikes in the event of the situation spiraling out of control.

(iv)  Provide very limited troops in non combat essentially as advisors to the Iraqi security forces.

(v)   Carry out limited transfer / sale of high tech equipment however, only after it has been verified that the same would not fall in the hands of the militants.

(vi)  Lean on governments in the region (Iran, Turkey and maybe Jordan) to support forces opposing the ISIS / ISIL with logistics militia and if required maybe even with troops.

         In the event of a militant threat to Kabul after the US withdrawal, it is likely that a solution may be sought on a similar structure. If that were to happen India may well come under pressure to take responsibility for supporting forces inimical to the militants. Prior to 9/11, Ahmed Shah Masood led Northern Alliance provided the critical opposition to Taliban as well as the forces which opposed them in battle. However, despite good intentions, the lack of logistics routes hampered Indian efforts in supporting the alliance.

        Hence, it is strongly felt that in view of the looming US withdrawal from Afghanistan, India needs to increase efforts to build and open logistics routes which can be ramped up if required to provide support to the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara dominated areas of Afghanistan. The role of Iran and the routes it can provide not only to Kabul and Heart in Afghanistan but also to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan would be critical.

Conclusion

That a total NATO and US pullout from Afghanistan would result in a Islamists / Taliban takeover of large swathes of the country, and eventually Kabul, is an opinion shared by many foreign policy experts. Recent developments in Iraq are changing the political dynamics of a pullout from Afghanistan. We are now seeing in the Sunni militant takeover of Fallujah and Anbar province what many would deem a major foreign policy failure of the US. More importantly, the US response to the evolving situation in Iraq would be an important guideline of how it would handle a similar situation in Afghanistan. The initial indications are that it may seek to lean on the regional powers to oppose the Islamists. India may be faced with a similar situation in Afghanistan – where opposing the militants would well be in its own interest too. To build options for the same, it is essential that logistics routes to Northern Afghanistan are developed well before the situation arises.

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Endnotes

1.  In this regard see http://www.grandestrategy.com/2009/06/research-paper-by-bilal-khan-paper-is.html.

2.   See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Khorasan.

3.   See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslim_conquest_of_Persia

4.   See http://defence.pk/threads/ghazwa-e-hind-myth-or-truth.95279/ and http://pakistannislam.blogspot.in/2013/03/signs-of-ghazwa-e-hind.html#.U6uyy5SSzfI

5.   See http://ghazwatulhind.wordpress.com/2010/08/09/hadith-of-ghazwatuhind-with-references/

6.   See http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/ghazwa and https://www.wordnik.com/words/ghazwa

7.   See http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/state-world-explaining-us-strategy#axzz35iLcxZ5W

8.   See http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2011/05/how-to-ward-off-threats-to-pak-nuclear.html

9.   See http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/state-world-explaining-us-strategy#axzz35iLcxZ5W

10.   See http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/election-presidency-and-foreign-policy#axzz35iLcxZ5W

11.  See http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/emerging-doctrine-united-states#axzz35iLcxZ5W

12.  See http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/borderlands-new-strategic-landscape?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20140506&utm_term=Gweekly&utm_content=readmore

*Colonel Akshaya Handa was commissioned into 7 PARA and commanded 19 RR (SIKH LI). He is a member of USI.

(Article uploaded on June 27, 2014).

http://www.usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Strategic%20Perspective&pubno=40&ano=2680

Article for USI Jun 14

http://www.usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Strategic%20Perspective&pubno=40&ano=2678

Leveraging International Pressures to Neutralise Pakistan Based Terror NetworkColonel Akshaya Handa*

India has long been subjected to terror sponsored from Pakistan. It however, has not been the only country which has suffered from the malaise. The US Department of State alone at various times has identified Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria amongst others as state sponsors of terrorism[1]. The list in more recent times is reported to include Pakistan, Venezuela, Russia, Qatar, Eretria, Lebanon, Syria and Cuba amongst others. Daniel Byman, a leading scholar on terrorism defines state sponsorship as “a government's intentional assistance to a terrorist group to help it use violence, bolster its political activities, or sustain organisation.” His research identifies six areas in which states provide support to terrorists — training and operations; money, arms, and logistics; diplomatic backing; organisational assistance; ideological direction; and sanctuary[2].

       Such state sponsored terror, has traditionally been combated by a combination of engagement, economic pressure, international pressure and / or force[3]. However, use of force, though effective in extreme cases may not be an option when dealing with a nuclear armed Pakistan. Hence, a combination of engagement, international and economic pressure may well be the only options available. Amongst these Pakistan has been most susceptible to international pressure especially when it includes the US and China. Under their pressure at various times, Pakistan has taken action against militants in Afghanistan, selected militants groups in Jan 2002[4], Kashmir Groups in 2006-07[5], Lal Masjid[6]^,[7], etc. Pakistan however, has managed to contain and limit their actions by :–

(a)  Showing itself to be indispensable to the international efforts to stabilise Afghanistan based upon :–

(i)   What it tries to project as its ability to manage the militants in Afghanistan.

(ii)   Its control over the logistics routes.

(b)   Selectively targeting some militants and letting others get away.

        Once more a situation seems to be emerging wherein it may be possible to build effective international pressure on Pakistan to dismantle its terror infrastructure when: -

(a)    Pakistan’s ability and/or willingness to manage militants is being questioned.

(b)   Options are feasible to reduce/eliminate Pakistan’s stranglehold over the logistics to Afghanistan. An option which has the potential to act as the required economic pressure too.

(c)      Pakistan itself has started to realise the futility of selective targeting of militants as visible in the offensive launched against TTP on 23 May 14[8]. The offensive has been launched against the TTP in an area which is not far from the camps of the Haqqani group that are friendly to the Pak army and are also known to shelter, train and have common cadres with some Kashmir groups[9].

Grassroots Amalgamation of Terror Groups

      With the exception of the Ahl-e-Hadith based LeT, all the other Punjabi groups trace their roots to the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. While the former is Salafist in orientation the latter were from the Deobandi Sect which is shared by the, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e- Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). Formed in 1989 and blending Deobandi and Wahhabi leanings, TNSM mobilized men for Taliban[10]. Thus with almost a common cadre the Punjabi groups increased their ties to one another as well as to the Afghan groups[11] during the 1990s[12].

      Post the raid on Lal Masjid and the eruption of insurgency in 2007-08, Pakistan security establishment started making more sustained counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts against anti-state militants inside and outside FATA. The focus however of these efforts remained on militants operating against the state while militants which the state thought it could control were protected[13]. Inevitably some anti-state militants inevitably seeped through in an effort to give safe passage to pro-state militants. The cumulative result has been to bog down a sizeable number of troops only to displace anti-state militants who later return or begin launching attacks elsewhere.

        The enormity of this vicious cycle seems to have dawned on the Pak security forces finally as for the first time an offensive has been launched in an area where the pro and anti-state militants are located in close vicinity[14]. While it is too early to say that Pakistan is abandoning its militant clones however, the realization that Pak can no longer differentiate between pro and anti-state militants can be a start point of the dismantling of the Pak terror infrastructure provided sufficient international pressure is brought to bear. The terrorism situation in China seems to suggest that in the months to come, China may well become a part of this international pressure.

Terrorism in China

        China in general and Xinjiang in particular have witnessed terror strikes over the years. Post each strike while the local government blamed the Pakistan based terror infrastructure; the central government followed a much softer approach[15]. However, the recent incidents have indicated emergence of three new trends which may change the latter.

       One, for the first time areas outside China's peripheral regions (Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia,) have been targeted. These regions historically have been held by China only when it was strong and its approach to various issues in these is distinctly different from the rest of China - also called the Chinese heartland or Han China. This newly displayed ability of the terrorists to strike in the Chinese heartland would certainly raise the decibels for action against Pak based infrastructure. Coming at a time when China is facing what some call socio-economic stress[16]; would only lead to more vocal calls for action.

        Two, while explosives had been used in terror strikes in China earlier, post 9/11 the Chinese security establishment had managed to keep these outside the options available for terrorists. The latter had to rely on more unconventional tools including knives, swords and even high speed vehicles to mow down the victims. However, the successful use of explosives in Urumqi on 22 May 14 shows that the terrorists have managed to bypass the Chinese security apparatus. While these were used well outside the Chinese heartland and more in a hand-grenade mode - in context of other less lethal strikes in the Chinese heartland - it would be vain to assume Han China to be secure from explosives any longer. Moreover once explosives are available[17] the graduation to much lethal (and safer for the terrorists) IEDs is but a matter of time. This would certainly place the security establishment under increased strain.

        Three, for the first time, indications suggest that apart from the so called separatist Muslims of Xinjiang - Muslims residing in other parts of China too have been affected by radicalisation and taken to terrorism. It is suspected that the 06 May 14 attack in Guangzhou, was carried out by the radicals of the Han Muslim Hui population[18]. Earlier too it was suspected that the Hui had been involved in sheltering the Xinjiang based terror suspects[19]. If true, it would imply that the reach of the radicals has managed to create a rift in the Han Chinese society. A rift which is not based on social or economic disparities but rather on religion, a development which can further increase problems for the Chinese security forces.

        Put together, the above would increase societal pressure on the Chinese regime to take action against the Pakistan based terror infrastructure. This may well be the opportune moment to rope in other powers, who too seek a dismantling of the Pak terror network. For this the importance of Pakistan in stabilising Afghanistan (including controlling its logistics route) needs to be reduced. In the regional context, these developments are occurring when a withdrawal / drawback of International Security Assistance Force from Afghanistan is imminent and a possible rapprochement between Iran and the US is on the horizon.

Pak – US Equation

The strategic value of Pakistan for the US essentially stems from Pakistan's perceived ability to manage the Islamic terror networks operating in Afghanistan and the logistics link controlled by it. Even while the US is seeking to withdraw its forces it wants to ensure against Afghanistan reverting to being a refuge for transnational jihad. At the end of the day, this is the real US national interest in Afghanistan[20]. To ensure the same, the US is seeking a bilateral security agreement which is a proposal to secure an external military presence beyond the predicted coalition withdrawal date of 2014. The US has tied the inflow of $4 billion in foreign aid annually with the signing of the same[21]. This does indicate a long term US commitment to Afghanistan and its security forces – which are expected to play a pivotal role in stabilising Afghanistan post the withdrawal. Hence, maintenance of the logistics link is crucial for the US role in the region. The issue becomes all the more critical as post Ukraine (and the western sanctions on Russia), the northern supply network passing through Russia is being questioned by the latter[22]. If the threat to deny the same becomes a reality, Pakistan’s leverage only increases.

       Even though the US has for long questioned Pak sincerity in tackling militants, it frequently had to abide by Pak sensibilities under the threat of disruption of supplies. Hence, even while questioning Pakistan’s sincerity, the logistics requirement for not only its own forces but also the fledgling Afghan National Security Forces, precludes the US from seriously seeking a break or challenging the Pakistan terror network[23]. This dependence would only increase in the short term as the US seeks a safe withdrawal and to stabilise the post withdrawal Afghanistan.

       Geographically Iran is ideally located to provide an alternate route and thus reduce / eliminate this dependence. Historically, not only it has been on the other side of the Shia - Sunni divide, but even in Afghanistan has been supporting forces opposing the Pakistan sponsored groups[24]. In more recent times the frequent massacre of Shias, actions of Pakistan based Jundullah group and the abduction of Iranian border guards by Pak based terrorist group Jaish al-Adl has led to major disagreements between the two. Complicating matters is the Iranian suspicion that Jaish al-Adl is Riyadh's agents as rival Saudi Arabia tries to undermine Iranian influence and stability[25]. Hence Iran has the incentive to provide a route to bypass Pakistan. Considering the stakes for Iran in Afghanistan, Iran may well welcome it.

         The infrastructure being built by India in Iran is ideally located to play the role. Chabahar port[26] and the road linking it to Zabol and thereafter through Zaranj and Delaram with Herat and Kabul[27] has reportedly been under construction for a while. The port was partially built by India in 1990s[28] and is connected to multimodal transportation system. It reportedly already has two jetties that connect it to international waterways and is handling 6 million tons of goods a year and has a reported capacity to handle up to 12.5 million tons a year[29]. It is connected to national road networks and the government is pursuing a railway project[30] which will connect Chabahar port to Central Asia, Afghanistan and Central Iran. With a suitable impetus to speed up its construction and scaling it up with possibly a gas / oil pipeline, it can cater for the logistics requirements of supporting the Afghan regime. In the long term it can also provide the link to the Central Asian Republics.

        It is anticipated that once the US dependence on the logistics routes through Pakistan is reduced, not only would Pakistan be deprived of the exorbitant transit fees being charged by it but the US and the Afghan National Security Forces would  also get a comparatively free hand for striking in the Pakistan tribal areas where this network thrives. If this was to occur when the Chinese too build up pressure for action against the terror infrastructure, the Pakistan Army may well be goaded to act against its cronies.

Conclusion

Pakistan had for long believed that it could control the activities of the militants created by it. Even when the insurgency broke out post the Lal Masjid incident, it continued to differentiate between the pro and anti-state militants. For the first time however, it has launched an offensive in an area occupied by militants of both shades. While it would be too early to believe the futility of their policy – differentiating between various militants – has finally been acknowledged; it is an opportune time to increase the international pressure for dismantling the terror network. Earlier too Pakistan has at least partly succumbed under such international pressure.

            It is anticipated that in the months to come, the Chinese Government is likely to come under domestic pressure to either act or at least seek action against the terror infrastructure in Pakistan. If prior to that the dependence (of the International Security Assistance Force and Afghan Security Forces) on the logistics routes through Pakistan is reduced and suitable alternatives made available – adequate pressure can be built on Pakistan to take appropriate action against the terror infrastructure. Chabahar port and the infrastructure linking it to Afghanistan and The Central Asian Republics would be ideal for the same and hence requires suitable impetus for early completion.

Endnotes

1.http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/5/terrorism%20byman/05_terrorism_byman.pdf

2.   Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism ,London: Cambridge University Press, 2005

3.   http://www.ukessays.com/dissertations/international-studies/cross-border-terrorism.php

4.   “Pakistani Television Airs Musharraf’s Taped Address,” CNN,January 12, 2002; “Pakistani President Bans Islamic Militant Groups,” CNN,January 12, 2002. On the influence of U.S. pressure and Pakistan’s desire to avoid war with India on the decision to institute the bans, see Tankel, Storming the World Stage, 115; Nayak and Krepon, “US Crisis Management.”

5.   Tankel, Storming the World Stage, p. 128; on Back Channel negotiations, see Steve Coll, “The Back Channel: India and Pakistan’s Secret Kashmir Talks,” New Yorker, March 2, 2009

6.   http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW89-Domestic%20Barriers%20to%20Dismantling%20the

% 20Militant%20Infrastructure%20in%20Pakistan.pdf

7.   Pardesi, “The Battle for the Soul,” p. 100; White, “Vigilante Islamism in Pakistan.”

8.   http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1528

9.   Op. Cit. 6.

10.  Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), p. 465

11.  Most notably Taliban, Haqqani network, and TNSM.

12.  Op. Cit. 6.

13.  Inevitably many operations ended with peace agreements with the insurgents. Emboldened, the militants operating there, began to occupy areas of SWAT before expanding to other districts of FATA [and more recently Baluchistan (see http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives /sair12/12_47.htm #assessment1)] too. Subsequently, the military did launch operations (like Operation Rah-e-Rast in May 2009 and Rah-e-Nijat the following month) in which they successfully routed many militants,

14.   http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1528

15.   http://www.southasaianalysis.org/node/1482 also see http://c3sindia.org/afghanistan/3090

16.   http://www.irgamag.com/component/k2/item/9135

17.   On 26 May 14, police reportedly seized 1.8 tonnes of bomb material in Xinjiang. See http://www.newsdeck120.com/articles/china-police-seize-1-dot-8-tonnes-of-bomb-material-in-xinjiang

18.  The Hui are of mixed ethnic origin, blending Han Chinese with ancestry from western China, Central Asia and the Middle East. There are Hui communities in most major cities, though they are mainly concentrated in southern Yunnan and the provinces stretching from the central-western portion of China to the coast, including Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Henan, Hebei and Shandong provinces. Although considered an ethnic minority in China, the Hui generally speak Mandarin Chinese. They maintain close relations with the majority Han and are distinguished more by their religious practices than by their ethnic traditions.

19.  http://www.irgamag.com/component/k2/item/8844

20.  http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100901_militancy_us_drawdown_afghanistan

21.  http://irgamag.com/component/k2/item/6014

22.  http://www.irgamag.com/component/k2/item/8328

23.  An example of this is when the US has slowed down drone operations under Pakistani pressure, as the Obama administration fears that Pakistani covert support to the Afghan Taliban and other Pak-backed terrorist formations operating in Afghanistan could significantly jeopardize the safety of its troops in the final phases of their ‘withdrawal’. See http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair12/12_8.htm#assessment1

24.  http://www.irgamag.com/component/k2/item/6105

25.  http://www.irgamag.com/component/k2/item/8246

26.  It has been reported that the port has become partly operational from 03 Mar 14, see http://www.manilatimes.net/india-advances-trade-plans-with-iran/81105/

27.  Through what is called route 606. Also called Afghanistan’s garland highway or AO 1.

28.   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_of_Chabahar

29.  http://www.livemint.com/Politics/1b1u7UDQbP7MecdCtaq4uK/UPA-racing-against-time-to-push-through-Chabahar-port-pact.html

30.  Which was named "Iran's eastern corridor"

*Colonel Akshaya Handa was commissioned into 7 PARA and commanded 19 RR (SIKH LI). He is a member of USI.

(Article uploaded on June 18, 2014).