In the wake of the 25 May 13 ambush by Maoist’s a large number of articles have appeared in various newspapers and journals with respect to the Maoists. The common themes in all include
The Maoist’s have filled the vacuum left by the governance deficit in the area.
The need to ensure that the society is not a part of operations and thereby not exacerbate the socio-economic-political problem {and yet some author’s (like the article Chhattisgarh Massacre by D Suba Chandran published in the Tribune on 05 Jun 13) have justified need for coercive force against the Maoists}.
The large number of tactical advantages enjoyed by the Maoists.
Firstly, the contention that the Naxals have moved into the vacuum left by the governance deficit due to the state abandoning its primary responsibility fails to define why the same government structures have succeeded in some parts to keep the Naxals out. Maharashtra is a case in point where only the district of Gadchiroli has been affected even though other areas (notably Vidarbha) are much worst. Further, those who thus seek to portray the Maoist’s as ‘Robin Hood’s’ or ‘’Gandhians with Guns’ are unable to justify how destroying schools, stopping road construction etc would fill this governance vacuum and lead to betterment of the population. These actions only go to prove that the actions of the Maoists are inspired by a pure lust for power and, violence against the state forces while keeping the population ignorant and backward is their chosen route.
In this context, it needs to be noted that in 2004 the Maoists were divided and on the ropes when an ill conceived ceasefire was announced which allowed the Maoists to not only bounce back but also to affect a merger between Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist), People's War (People's War Group), and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) – the rest is history. The so called governance deficit has been a constant prior to, during and after this transition. The point is that while governance deficits may exist or maybe claimed military means to subdue the insurgency and create a semblance of security are a must before governance issues can really be addressed. No society or nation has ever out developed an ongoing insurgency.
Secondly, the contention that the counter insurgency strategy has to ensure that society is not a part of military operations seems to suggest that the latter have to operate in isolation. This is a sure recipe for failure. No counter insurgency strategy can ever succeed without society and military operations being in synch. Yes, Salwa Judam was an aberration as it sought society’s involvement to an undesirable extreme. The majority of the population are fence sitters, who to survive side with the one who at that point is more powerful. Unless these fence sitters are galvanised a counter insurgency strategy would fail. One such example is the ongoing situation in Panjwai Afghanistan where local discontent has been galvanised leading to a virtual eviction of the Taliban from its birthplace. Even in India, South Asia Terrorist Portal cites at least nine cases of lynching of Maoists by the locals in 2009 in Jharkhand alone. Many more of such incidents from other areas are being reported by various agencies before and since. However, nothing has been reported of galvanising this discontent.
Thirdly the contention by some that the CRPF has no other option other than using coercive force – is misleading and would only exacerbate the problem. Coercive force when used only alienates people further and historically has never solved any insurgency. The Sri Lankan forces tried it but could not tame the LTTE till the latter did a mistake of fighting conventionally. Similar tactics in Algeria ensured that the French won the war militarily but lost it politically. Even within the country our Army has set high standards of success without coercive force in Kashmir, Punjab and North East. It was also a highlight of the much talked about Andhra model.
Any strategy needs to target the opponent’s weaknesses which need to be analysed –the advantages enjoyed by the Naxals point at best to the defensive measures that the forces need to implement. These weaknesses of the Naxals need to be analysed and exploited.
The first is their leadership, which is essentially Telgu in character while the rank and file is local. A lot of discontent on the issue is being reported. In Orissa, this led to the expulsion of Sabyasachi Panda, who had floated his own outfit – the Odisha Maovadi Party (OMP). Initial support to such breakaway groups, using them for intelligence and slowly converting them is tactic employed everywhere. Sri Lanka gained an upper hand only after Muralitharan broke away from the Tamil Tigers in 2004. It’s an invitation for success.
The second is their organisational structure, which in all Maoist movements worldwide is a steep pyramid. Where ever they have been defeated – from the Shining Path Guerrillas in Peru, to the Communist rebels in Malaya to the National Liberation Army of Bolivia (after Che Guevara’s death) – targeted liquidation (killing / capture / surrender) of the top few has played an important part. Even in India the overall decline in incidents (despite an increase in ferocity in some) has been a result of neutralization of a large number of leaders and cadres. Similarly, bomb making is a specialized task, which can only be carried out by a few highly trained individual, targeting them can make a major dent in their military capability. The question is have we even been able to identify them?
Thirdly, finance – the essential spirit which fuels all insurgencies. Ajit Kumar Singh and Sachin Banisdhar in their article ‘Red Money’ in outlook have suggested the annual Naxal budget in tens of billions. Such money cannot be kept either under the mattress or in the jungle. Reports suggest that legal routes are being employed for the purpose. Intelligence needs to be built on these and the funds denied to the Naxals by either a new law or by using provisions of the existing ones.
Fourthly their logistics, especially radios and bomb making equipment.
In all encounters and all recoveries there are reports of recovery of radio sets, they obviously are being used. Monitoring of such radio traffic can provide out of the proportion results both for intelligence and for targeting. Chechan leader Djokhar Musayevich Dudaev was killed on 21 April 1996, by two laser-guided missiles when he was using a satellite phone, after his location was detected by a Russian recce aircraft, which intercepted his phone call. It virtually led to a collapse of the first Chechan war. Such targeting need not be through aircrafts and missiles only, use of Special Forces to capitalize on such specific intelligence can be extremely productive – a tactic effectively used by the US forces during the Iraq war.
Moreover, most of the bombs used are ammonium nitrate / fuel oil mixture. The former is more than 90% of the volume and easily available in the form of fertilizers. Laws to regulate and control the availability of ammonium nitrate fertilizers have been implemented by many countries. We also need to control its availability and usage. Secondly, detonators cannot be made in the jungle. They have to be manufactured in factory conditions. Naxals obtain their detonators from the mining industry. However despite losing so many personnel to IEDs and bombs there is still no effort to make the mining industry accountable for the detonators that they obtain.
There would be many more weaknesses which analysts can point out. The war against the Naxals can be won in the short to medium term. The need of the hour is an imaginative leadership for the force engaged in these operations, one which is well versed and experienced in how the operations are conducted.
Article uploaded on 13 Jun 2013
Hosted by USI http://www.usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Strategic%20Perspective&pubno=36&ano=1721
The Maoist’s have filled the vacuum left by the governance deficit in the area.
The need to ensure that the society is not a part of operations and thereby not exacerbate the socio-economic-political problem {and yet some author’s (like the article Chhattisgarh Massacre by D Suba Chandran published in the Tribune on 05 Jun 13) have justified need for coercive force against the Maoists}.
The large number of tactical advantages enjoyed by the Maoists.
Firstly, the contention that the Naxals have moved into the vacuum left by the governance deficit due to the state abandoning its primary responsibility fails to define why the same government structures have succeeded in some parts to keep the Naxals out. Maharashtra is a case in point where only the district of Gadchiroli has been affected even though other areas (notably Vidarbha) are much worst. Further, those who thus seek to portray the Maoist’s as ‘Robin Hood’s’ or ‘’Gandhians with Guns’ are unable to justify how destroying schools, stopping road construction etc would fill this governance vacuum and lead to betterment of the population. These actions only go to prove that the actions of the Maoists are inspired by a pure lust for power and, violence against the state forces while keeping the population ignorant and backward is their chosen route.
In this context, it needs to be noted that in 2004 the Maoists were divided and on the ropes when an ill conceived ceasefire was announced which allowed the Maoists to not only bounce back but also to affect a merger between Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist), People's War (People's War Group), and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) – the rest is history. The so called governance deficit has been a constant prior to, during and after this transition. The point is that while governance deficits may exist or maybe claimed military means to subdue the insurgency and create a semblance of security are a must before governance issues can really be addressed. No society or nation has ever out developed an ongoing insurgency.
Secondly, the contention that the counter insurgency strategy has to ensure that society is not a part of military operations seems to suggest that the latter have to operate in isolation. This is a sure recipe for failure. No counter insurgency strategy can ever succeed without society and military operations being in synch. Yes, Salwa Judam was an aberration as it sought society’s involvement to an undesirable extreme. The majority of the population are fence sitters, who to survive side with the one who at that point is more powerful. Unless these fence sitters are galvanised a counter insurgency strategy would fail. One such example is the ongoing situation in Panjwai Afghanistan where local discontent has been galvanised leading to a virtual eviction of the Taliban from its birthplace. Even in India, South Asia Terrorist Portal cites at least nine cases of lynching of Maoists by the locals in 2009 in Jharkhand alone. Many more of such incidents from other areas are being reported by various agencies before and since. However, nothing has been reported of galvanising this discontent.
Thirdly the contention by some that the CRPF has no other option other than using coercive force – is misleading and would only exacerbate the problem. Coercive force when used only alienates people further and historically has never solved any insurgency. The Sri Lankan forces tried it but could not tame the LTTE till the latter did a mistake of fighting conventionally. Similar tactics in Algeria ensured that the French won the war militarily but lost it politically. Even within the country our Army has set high standards of success without coercive force in Kashmir, Punjab and North East. It was also a highlight of the much talked about Andhra model.
Any strategy needs to target the opponent’s weaknesses which need to be analysed –the advantages enjoyed by the Naxals point at best to the defensive measures that the forces need to implement. These weaknesses of the Naxals need to be analysed and exploited.
The first is their leadership, which is essentially Telgu in character while the rank and file is local. A lot of discontent on the issue is being reported. In Orissa, this led to the expulsion of Sabyasachi Panda, who had floated his own outfit – the Odisha Maovadi Party (OMP). Initial support to such breakaway groups, using them for intelligence and slowly converting them is tactic employed everywhere. Sri Lanka gained an upper hand only after Muralitharan broke away from the Tamil Tigers in 2004. It’s an invitation for success.
The second is their organisational structure, which in all Maoist movements worldwide is a steep pyramid. Where ever they have been defeated – from the Shining Path Guerrillas in Peru, to the Communist rebels in Malaya to the National Liberation Army of Bolivia (after Che Guevara’s death) – targeted liquidation (killing / capture / surrender) of the top few has played an important part. Even in India the overall decline in incidents (despite an increase in ferocity in some) has been a result of neutralization of a large number of leaders and cadres. Similarly, bomb making is a specialized task, which can only be carried out by a few highly trained individual, targeting them can make a major dent in their military capability. The question is have we even been able to identify them?
Thirdly, finance – the essential spirit which fuels all insurgencies. Ajit Kumar Singh and Sachin Banisdhar in their article ‘Red Money’ in outlook have suggested the annual Naxal budget in tens of billions. Such money cannot be kept either under the mattress or in the jungle. Reports suggest that legal routes are being employed for the purpose. Intelligence needs to be built on these and the funds denied to the Naxals by either a new law or by using provisions of the existing ones.
Fourthly their logistics, especially radios and bomb making equipment.
In all encounters and all recoveries there are reports of recovery of radio sets, they obviously are being used. Monitoring of such radio traffic can provide out of the proportion results both for intelligence and for targeting. Chechan leader Djokhar Musayevich Dudaev was killed on 21 April 1996, by two laser-guided missiles when he was using a satellite phone, after his location was detected by a Russian recce aircraft, which intercepted his phone call. It virtually led to a collapse of the first Chechan war. Such targeting need not be through aircrafts and missiles only, use of Special Forces to capitalize on such specific intelligence can be extremely productive – a tactic effectively used by the US forces during the Iraq war.
Moreover, most of the bombs used are ammonium nitrate / fuel oil mixture. The former is more than 90% of the volume and easily available in the form of fertilizers. Laws to regulate and control the availability of ammonium nitrate fertilizers have been implemented by many countries. We also need to control its availability and usage. Secondly, detonators cannot be made in the jungle. They have to be manufactured in factory conditions. Naxals obtain their detonators from the mining industry. However despite losing so many personnel to IEDs and bombs there is still no effort to make the mining industry accountable for the detonators that they obtain.
There would be many more weaknesses which analysts can point out. The war against the Naxals can be won in the short to medium term. The need of the hour is an imaginative leadership for the force engaged in these operations, one which is well versed and experienced in how the operations are conducted.
Article uploaded on 13 Jun 2013
Hosted by USI http://www.usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Strategic%20Perspective&pubno=36&ano=1721
